

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 13 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

(Romania)

63-15352

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Atc M. GHEREYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we proceed with our work, I should like to welcome to our presence Dr. Šimović, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, who is now the leader of the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. I think that the Committee will join with me in wishing our new colleague success in our work.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could begin by echoing your words of welcome to our new Czech colleague. May I tell him that we shall be very happy to work with him and shall look forward to his participation in solving some of the problems that still exist between us. We will not invoke him too early in any problems between ourselves and our Soviet colleagues, as the last thing we would wish to do would be to embarrass him, but we look forward with keen interest to his participation.

On the last occasion when we were due to discuss nuclear tests -- last Monday -- we discussed another matter of very considerable importance. I was the next on the list to speak on nuclear tests, and I deferred until today the speech I had prepared on that subject. I was very glad to do so in view of the circumstances, but I should like now to revert to the matters I wished to put before the Committee at that meeting.

My intention was to deal with and comment on some of the points arising from the previous meeting devoted solely to nuclear tests, namely, the meeting of two weeks ago today, for in reading the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.126) I had been struck by a number of remarks made by our Soviet colleague on that occasion which seemed to me to be yet one further indication of his determination --- I put it as strongly as that --- to misrepresent the Western position. I shall want to go into one or two of those remarks, because I think it is unfortunate when one of our colleagues seeks to do that. In my view, it really does not help our work forward at all.

Firstly, in this context, I should like to deal with a statement by Mr. Tsarapkin which dealt particularly with the attitude of the United Kingdom --- and indeed he did me the honour of referring to me personally. Mr. Tsarapkin is recorded as saying:

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"We believe that its /the United States/ British allies, who are devoting a good deal of intelligence, energy and resourcefulness..."

I was quite happy with it so far, and if he had stopped at that I should have had no criticism; but then he went on:

"to preventing an agreement, as Mr. Godber is constantly doing, would hardly venture for long to resist and prevent an agreement if the United States were willing to come to terms." (ENDC/PV.126, pp. 26,27)

Later, in his reply to my colleague Sir Paul Mason, Mr. Tsarapkin suggested (ibid., p.33) that Sir Paul's statement on that occasion had been striking because it emphasized once again the role played by the United Kingdom in these negotiations. I think that no one could have been left in any doubt that Mr. Tsarapkin implied on that occasion that that role was an obstructive one.

I do not think for a moment that our Soviet colleague's argument in that sense will have carried much influence with the rest of the Committee, but I feel it is necessary to put such charges into their proper perspective and to put the record straight, because of course, as all our colleagues here know perfectly well, the United Kingdom has never at any stage obstructed negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Indeed, the very opposite is the case, and we have done everything in our power to move negotiations forward and to induce the Soviet Union to get down to serious discussion with us.

I think that if we have embarrassed our Soviet colleague at all it has possibly been because of our willingness to meet him to discuss these various matters which he finds so difficult to agree upon, or even to discuss with us. I am quite prepared to go into detail and to cite a very large number of occasions on which the United Kingdom delegation has tried to get things moving and, to that end, has said quite unequivocally that it is prepared to be completely flexible in its approach. Had Mr. Tsarapkin taken a similar attitude of flexibility -- had he done so just once -- I believe we might even have had a treaty by now.

I have brought with me just a few references to some of the United Kingdom speeches on this subject during the past fourteen months. I have made extracts from twenty of the verbatim records and am perfectly willing to read out in extenso the definite proposals made in order to try to get things moving, and to bring another twenty on another occasion if Mr. Tsarapkin is still unsatisfied and still feels that we are seeking to prevent agreement. On this occasion they range from an initial speech by

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Lord Hume (ENDC/PV.5, pp. 5 et seq.) through a whole variety of speeches by me -- if the Committee would like me to stop and quote from any of them I should be very happy to do so -- on 3 April (ENDC/PV.14, p.23 et seq.), 12 April (ENDC/PV.19, p.33 et seq.), 16 April (ENDC/PV.21, pp. 18, 19, 22, 23), 19 April (ENDC/PV.24, pp. 11 et seq.), and 25 April 1962 (ENDC/PV.27, pp. 42 et seq.), all of them containing proposals designed to get things moving, and speeches by my former colleague Sir Michael Wright on 7 May (ENDC/PV.32, pp. 5 et seq.) and 9 May 1962 (ENDC/PV.34, pp. 39 et seq.), and then by me again on 18 May (ENDC/PV.39, pp. 39 et seq.). And so it continues through the summer months of June, July and August. It makes very interesting reading for anyone wanting to refresh his mind on the United Kingdom attitude to all these matters, and it goes on to the beginning of March of this year. Those are just a few of the positive proposals we have put forward directly related to getting matters moving on the subject of a nuclear test ban.

As I say, if our Soviet colleague is willing to show sufficient flexibility to enter into serious discussion on any of these proposals, or on a similar batch which I shall be happy to bring forward another day, then I think we might make progress; but I have done what I have merely in order to point to the absurdity -- and the absurdity our Soviet colleagues knows it to be -- of the charges he made on the last occasion when we discussed this subject.

I hope that that will dispose of his views on the attitude of the United Kingdom; but if he wants to test us on this let him offer to discuss with us in detail any aspects of the nuclear test ban in an effort to find mutual agreement -- not agreement on the terms dictated by the Soviet Union, but mutual agreement. Mutual agreement means, I should have thought, a willingness to see the other man's view and to seek to find some point of accommodation between the two sides. That is the United Kingdom attitude on the subject; and I hope that that deals sufficiently with those particular charges.

So much for the role of the United Kingdom in these discussions. Now I turn to another matter raised by our Soviet colleague a fortnight ago, on 29 April. I refer to Mr. Tsarapkin's suggestion then (ENDC/PV.126, p.25) -- and on that occasion he gave the honours to our United States colleague -- that the West, and especially the United States, had been trying for a long time to conceal the progress made in the technique of the detection of seismic events; to conceal it from the world at large and from the people of the United States in particular. That sort of charge is not only completely without foundation but thoroughly harmful to any serious discussion and negotiation here.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Mr. Tsarapkin knows perfectly well that when information has been published in the last year or two about the science and the technique of the detection of seismic events, it has been published solely by the West and has been based on the results of research carried out in the West in which on many occasions the Soviet Union has been invited to participate. I myself have invited our Soviet colleague more than once to join us in these research projects, but the Soviet Union has consistently refused to participate. The Soviet Union has furthermore claimed to have information on the techniques of detection derived from its own sources; but it has refused to publish that information. Hence I would say that the Soviet Union is in a singularly bad position to accuse others of withholding information, because if anyone is concealing information in this respect it is not the West. I think we should therefore have an end to charges such as the one I have just cited.

May I turn now to the statement of our Soviet colleague in the same speech on the whole question of the capacity of existing detection systems for detecting and identifying all seismic events of whatever size? I think this lies at the root of the major difficulty between us on the question of the need or lack of need for on-site inspection. It occurs time and again in this speech. For example, on 29 April Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The point is that, having recognized the effectiveness of national systems of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States ought to have abandoned completely all claims in respect of on-site inspection."
(ibid., p. 26)

Again, a little later he suggested that the United States,

"... having recognized the effectiveness of national detection systems for control over underground nuclear explosions, ... has not drawn the appropriate conclusion in regard to inspection, as it should have done."
(ibid., p.27)

And he went on to say:

"The Soviet Union considers that for control over an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, no inspection is necessary or required. This position of the Soviet Union is meeting with ever new confirmation day after day in the achievements of science and technology.

"However, despite those facts, the United States is stubbornly trying to secure inspection." (ibid.)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The Soviet Union representative apparently claims that the information available on the techniques of detection of seismic events should have persuaded the Western Powers that all events can be detected and identified. That simply is not so. We have explained, and we have explained many times, in this Committee that the information available to us does not lead us to think that all doubtful events can be identified. On the other hand we have said that, if the Soviet Union can produce evidence and would be willing to discuss it with us, in order to show that the present techniques are adequate to identify satisfactorily all seismic events, then we are prepared to consider that evidence and to consider modifying our position on inspection. Surely that is a reasonable attitude to adopt -- to say that we in fact have not this information, but that we are perfectly willing to study any evidence which others may bring forward that it does exist.

That is the Western position; it has been the Western position consistently; and of course we come back once again to a point which I have made many times in our discussions, which is that ever since the Soviet Union repudiated the experts' report (EXP/NUC/28) of 1958 we have had no agreed basis on which to proceed. The Soviet Union alone repudiated that report. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to participate in clearing up what the exact factual position is today. The Soviet Union relies on ex parte statements which it repeats here ad nauseam on this subject; but it will not produce evidence, and it does not attempt to accept our invitation to meet together to clear this matter up. That, I suggest, is not the attitude which is going to help us forward to agreement. If we could get agreement on these simple facts -- or perhaps it is wrong to call them simple facts: complicated facts -- between our scientists on the best information that is available in the world on both detection and identification, then I believe that it would help us materially in solving our present dispute.

Our present dispute centres largely round the basis of knowledge on which the two respective positions rest, and we still stand ready to have meetings to clarify this particular matter. While our Soviet Union colleagues have never accepted our invitations to have meetings of experts, at the same time there have been meetings of scientists -- and I am glad there have been -- in different forums on different occasions, where some of these matters have been gone into. That is particularly

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

so in the case of meetings of scientists under the Pugwash arrangements. Last autumn there was a meeting of scientists, including scientists from the United States, the Soviet Union and my own country, at one of those Pugwash conferences in England, and afterwards a certain document was produced by three Soviet scientists and three American scientists which clearly indicated a continuing need for on-site inspection. When the matter was raised a long time ago by the Soviet Union representative, I took the liberty of tabling that report as a Conference document in order to clarify the position. In view of the constant reaffirmations by the Soviet Union representative it is as well to remind ourselves of its last paragraph, which reads:

"We think a system developed along these lines" —

that is, the lines of the possibility of using "black boxes" which had been discussed —

"may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the International Control Commission will need to request very few on-site inspections. If this is true, it may provide a new basis for negotiation in the Geneva discussions and ease the problem of resolving the on-site inspection issue." (ENDC/66, p.2)

That was a document signed by three Soviet and three American scientists, and the point of the paragraph which I have just quoted is that they are saying that, if we accept the idea of unmanned seismic stations, within Soviet territory as well as within our own, and have the advantage of the data provided, then, with that additional data from inside the Soviet Union which will be available to the International Control Commission, it will be necessary to request very few on-site inspections. The implication is that without that data a very considerable number of on-site inspections would still be necessary, but that even with the additional data there still remains a need for obligatory on-site inspection. That report was signed by Academician Artsimovich, Professor Ritznichenko and Academician Tamm of the Soviet Union, as well as by the three American scientists.

In the face of that, how can the Soviet representative keep claiming, as he did in the quotations which I gave a few moments ago, that as far as the Soviet Union is concerned there is no need for on-site inspection? I have asked the representative of the Soviet Union before if he is in fact repudiating his own scientists in this matter. He has always been very careful not to do so, and I am glad that he does not, but I should have thought it quite senseless for him to continue with claims that no on-site inspection is necessary when his own scientists do not bear him out.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

There have, of course, been further meetings of scientists since that date. As far as I know there have been no published documents from those further meetings; it would be wrong, therefore, for me to comment on them. I have seen certain reports, but I should not have called the attention of the Committee once more to the document which I have quoted if I had thought that since then anything had emerged, or any discussion had taken place, which in any way invalidated it.

Therefore, I do say to the representative of the Soviet Union that we really must ask him to accept, if not Western protestations, then at least the protestations of his own scientists. I think that that is not an unreasonable attitude for the West to take, and I do bring him back to this point because it is really a key point in the whole of our discussions, and I hope that we shall have a more realistic approach to it.

Now I come to just one other point in connexion with the Soviet representative's speech on that occasion. I hope that he does not mind my referring on so many occasions to his comments; at least it shows him that I study what he has to say. This particular point disturbs me because he has repeated it not only in relation to nuclear tests but also in relation to other aspects of our Conference when he has referred to our discussions here as becoming a waste of time (ENDC/PV.126, p.24). I think that is a very dangerous sort of idea to propagate in this Conference. I want to tell the Conference, and especially our Soviet colleague, quite categorically that the United Kingdom does not regard our discussions here as a waste of time.

But if they are a waste of time, or are becoming a waste of time, why is that? Why does it seem so to some people? Is it, I wonder, because one country, and one country alone, refuses to enter into detailed negotiations in the field of nuclear tests? Is it because one country alone, the Soviet Union, refuses to discuss any points relating to a nuclear test ban treaty? Is it because one country alone, the Soviet Union, refuses to disclose information which it claims to have and which it claims could render on-site inspection unnecessary? Is it because the Soviet Union refuses to have joint meetings of scientists here to agree on new scientific data governing detection and identification? Is it because the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union alone, refuses to ban nuclear tests in the other three environments while we continue to work on agreement in relation to underground tests? All those things the Soviet Union refuses. We and our United States colleagues have all along shown our willingness to enter into serious discussion on all those matters.

I would suggest to our Soviet colleague that he is in danger of forgetting the meaning of the word "negotiate". To "negotiate", in my understanding of it, does not mean to state one's own position flatly and then abuse one's negotiating partners

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

because they do not accept it in toto. That is not negotiation as I understand it, but that seems to be the position that our Soviet colleague adopts. Really, there must be serious negotiation, there must be a willingness to be flexible, if we are to reach agreement. So I do say to Mr. Tsarapkin very seriously that I believe that those speeches, with their constant reiteration of accusations of bad faith against the West, those speeches which indicate complete immobility and complete refusal to enter into the details of negotiation -- refusal even to agree with us the facts which are the basis on which the negotiations should proceed -- cannot help forward our work.

However, in spite of that I say to him that our work here is not, and should not be, a waste of time. I say to him that we have a great duty here to find ways of minimizing our differences, to find ways of meeting one another; and I believe we must do that, that world opinion is pressing us very hard -- and very rightly so -- to do that; because in the field of nuclear tests, and even more, I would suggest, in the field of general and complete disarmament, a heavy burden rests upon us.

We in the United Kingdom delegation are very ready, as we have shown on many occasions both in this field and in others, to enter into serious negotiations, and to do so with a flexibility which will enable agreements to be arrived at. But it does not help us when we hear continued charges such as those our Soviet colleague has rather indulged in in recent weeks. So I do say to him -- and I try to say it in the friendliest spirit -- that we are still ready to negotiate with him, but we are waiting for him to adopt an attitude which would enable us to be successful in these discussions.

I have dwelt at some length on this subject because I am definitely worried about the whole emotional atmosphere which our Soviet colleague has been building up in recent weeks. I am urging him to get away from that; I am telling him that we want to make progress, and I am inviting him to go forward with us in that task.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to exercise my right of reply in order not to leave unanswered the remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom. The purpose of my brief comment is to dispel the false impression which Mr. Godber has been trying to create here. In order to give a proper assessment of the situation in the Committee with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, I could refer to what I said on that subject two weeks ago, on 29 April. I then adduced a whole series of data confirming and testifying to the fact that the United States had finally recognized the effectiveness of national control

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

systems, not only in regard to the detection of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, but also in regard to the detection of underground nuclear explosions. What I said was the following:

"However, having admitted the effectiveness of national means of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States lapsed into an obvious inconsistency in its position, an inconsistency which has in fact led our negotiations on this question once again into an impasse. The point is that, having recognized the effectiveness of national systems of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States ought to have abandoned completely all claims in respect of on-site inspection. At the present time the demand for on-site inspection is untenable and unnecessary from the standpoint of control. This was in fact admitted by the United States scientists, who in the aforementioned letter of 9 April stated that they regarded on-site inspection only as an additional guarantee. But the official position of the United States in our negotiations here in Geneva has not undergone any essential or radical changes in regard to inspection. The present position of the United States is inconsistent and does not stand up to criticism.

Well, then, the situation at present is clear enough. The negotiations have again reached an impasse because of the position of the United States. The responsibility for this lies entirely with the United States." (ENDC/PV.126, p.26)

It seems to us that the assessment of the situation with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which we made two weeks ago is just as valid and correct today and, in our view, completely answers all the remarks made here by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): First, my delegation would like to welcome to the Conference the new leader of the Czechoslovak delegation, Mr. Šimovič, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; and may I take this opportunity to welcome also the return to our deliberations of Mr. Zemla, whom we have not seen for some time?

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The reply of the Soviet representative to the very convincing statement of the United Kingdom representative (supra, pp.5 et seq.) seemed to me singularly unconvincing. The Soviet representative merely repeated a claim which he had made before and for which there is no foundation: that the United States has recognized the adequacy of control without inspections in the underground environment. He has not favoured us by telling us why he believes that he can make that statement; he has merely repeated it, and it is, of course, not accurate.

Furthermore, as our United Kingdom colleague pointed out this morning, the requirement of on-site inspections in the underground environment, when we cannot tell by instrumentation alone what all events are, is one which has been recognized by Soviet scientists themselves, specifically in the document emanating from the Pugwash meetings (ENDC/66) to which the United Kingdom representative recalled our attention this morning.

I should like to associate my delegation with what the United Kingdom representative said in his statement this morning. I think it must be clear to all of us here that, if we are to make progress in these negotiations, the Soviet delegation will have to come forward and make its position clear on a number of the major issues before us, and particularly on the arrangements for on-site inspection. It seems clear that until that happens there will be little hope of our moving forward.

For my part, I should like today to examine briefly what our Soviet colleague has been telling us over the past few weeks. In this examination I think it might be useful to make clear to the delegations here where the lines of argument used by the Soviet representative are apparently intended to lead us.

At our last meeting at which the nuclear test ban problem was discussed, on 29 April, the Soviet representative's statement contained in microcosm the whole point of view which he has tried to present to us over the past few months. In the first place, he said that we had already passed the stage in our negotiations of the search for "a mutually-acceptable compromise solution". He went on to say that he considered what was going on in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as "a sheer waste of time". He stated also that our efforts in the field of general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures yielded very much the same negative

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results (ENDC/PV.126, p.24). Of course, what the Soviet representative is saying, in a form slightly different from that used by him in the past, is that we must agree entirely with the Soviet position or, as far as he is concerned, the Conference is a waste of time.

Our United Kingdom colleague has rightly taken our Soviet colleague to task for the dangers inherent in such a statement; and I believe all of us in the West would strongly disagree with the Soviet representative. We cannot really believe that a Soviet ultimatum on the issues of a nuclear test ban treaty can continue indefinitely to remain a bar to agreement, particularly when the character of the ultimatum is as transparent as is the present position of the Soviet Government.

Let us take a look at the argument which the Soviet representative has propounded about the present Soviet position being a compromise position. If that assertion of the Soviet representative had any foundation, it would mean that the Soviet position at present would lie somewhere ahead of the most advanced past position of the Soviet Union and nearer the most advanced United Kingdom United States position. But is that really the case?

In the first place, the Soviet representative has told us that his position is really a compromise because it represents acceptance of offers allegedly made by United States and United Kingdom representatives. We have already made the record clear on those allegations. In every case where there was a verbatim record of the statements in question it is clear the United States and United Kingdom representatives had asked the Soviet Union to return to the principle of on-site inspection which it had accepted until 28 November 1961 but had abandoned after that date. In no case were Western representatives asking the Soviet Government to agree to any specific number of inspections. In addition, where private conversations were held, the United States representatives have made clear our record of such conversations. In no case were offers made of the numbers of inspections now being offered by the Soviet Union.

Finally, in a letter (ENDC/74) from the President of the United States on 28 December 1962 the United States position on the question of the numbers of on-site inspections was clearly stated, and therefore there should be no question about alleged offers of a different number.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The present Soviet position on the numbers of on-site inspections represents no more than a return to an old position held by the Soviet Union before 28 November 1961. To pretend that a re-acceptance of a former position -- a position rejected by the other side for the full period of time during which that position was in effect -- is really something new seems to us to be a stance which somehow ignores all sense of reality. But that is exactly what the Soviet Union is doing.

Even more unfortunate is the fact that the Soviet representative seems to be laying the foundation for another grand retreat along the lines of the last grand retreat of the Soviet Union from the principle of on-site inspection on 28 November 1961. Obviously it would be most unfortunate if the Soviet Union were once again to move us away from agreement in the way it did in 1961.

Certainly Soviet acceptance -- or, rather, re-acceptance -- of the principle of on-site inspection has done much to bring the possibility of agreement closer. We have welcomed it warmly, and have stated our belief that such a move, whatever its rationale, has been a contribution to our work if, in fact, this position is one to which the Soviet Union really intends to adhere.

The failure of the Soviet Union to spell out the arrangements under which it would accept such inspection seems to my delegation to raise real doubts about whether the Soviet Union really has re-accepted the principle of on-site inspection. To retreat from a real acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection now, however, would only serve further to disrupt our efforts to reach agreement and would be a grave reflection on the seriousness of the intention of the Soviet Union to reach a nuclear test ban treaty.

Unfortunately, in this connexion, the Soviet representative has dredged up all of the old Soviet interpretations by which the Soviet delegation has sought in the past to construe the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) of 16 April 1962 as meaning something different from what it actually means. It is the sharp contrast of the eight-nation memorandum's endorsement of the necessity for some on-site inspections to identify unidentified events with the Soviet representative's unsupported statements that inspections are only "an additional guarantee" (ENDC/PV.119, p.22) that should put these efforts of the Soviet Union into real perspective.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

At our meeting on 29 April the Soviet representative stated, as he has frequently stated before:

"... the facts and data relating to the progress of science and technology still further corroborated the position of the Soviet Government that no inspection is required for control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests." (ENDC/PV.126, pp.27,28)

The Soviet representative then said that that view was supported by the many quotations which he has taken out of context from United Kingdom and United States scientific sources. He repeated that today (supra, pp.12-13). But his statement is wholly unsupported by any facts or data -- Soviet, American or British -- which are available to or have been placed before this Conference. If the Soviet Union seriously believes those allegations about the capabilities of national systems, it should be able to provide facts and data to support this belief -- a belief which, by the way, the arguments used by the Soviet representative himself show is as much a scientific question as it is a political question.

Once again we ask the Soviet representative, if he has these facts or data, to present them to us. If he fails to do so, as he has failed in the past, we ask him respectfully to refrain from such unfounded allegations. Making such allegations really serves to waste our time and to detract from our efforts here to reach agreement. Let our Soviet colleague rather use our time to good effect by coming forth with at least some of the major portions of the Soviet Union's position on a test ban, particularly on the question of inspections -- a position which up to now it has shrouded in mystery.

Unfortunately, the Soviet representative seems now intent on diverting our attention from our main effort, which should be to discuss and agree upon the main portions of a treaty which would ensure the effective cessation of nuclear weapon testing. He has used arguments which add up to an ultimatum, and then attempted to place the burden for lack of progress on the West. He has claimed that his positions are purely political, but he has tried to distort the statement of eminent Western scientists in order somehow technically to prove his case. In each of those instances he has, of course, tried to divert the attention of the Conference from the weakest

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

part of the Soviet position, which is the absolute lack of flexibility shown here by the Soviet Union and the complete failure of the Soviet Union to put forward a concrete position on most of the outstanding issues of a nuclear test ban treaty.

We call again on the Soviet Union to re-examine the completely negative position it is attempting to maintain in the Conference. We can begin to make real progress only when the Soviet Union abandons its negative position. It is the hope of my delegation that we shall soon see a change in the Soviet Union's position which will move our work along towards an effective test ban treaty.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-first plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Macovescu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 15 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.